In 2025, freehold shoeboxes sell 14.6% below the family units beside them

In 2025 a freehold shoebox sells for about 15% less per square foot than a freehold family unit. A leasehold shoebox still sells for more than a leasehold family unit: 5.1% more, down from 28.9% in 2017. The small-unit premium has collapsed in both, but it went negative in freehold four years ago and has never gone negative in leasehold. The rest of what we found about shoebox units in Singapore is on the shoebox units guide.

We have been tracking the collapse of the shoebox premium: across the market as a whole, then by region, where a shoebox in the core central region (CCR) has gone backwards in nominal terms since 2017 while one in the outside central region (OCR) gained a quarter. Tenure is the next obvious cut, and the one buyers ask about most.

One thing to know before the tables. Each tenure is measured against itself: freehold shoeboxes against freehold family units, leasehold against leasehold. We are not comparing freehold prices to leasehold prices: those differ for reasons of location and age that have nothing to do with tenure. What we are comparing is the premium inside each, which is a ratio and therefore unaffected by one tenure sitting at a higher absolute price than the other. Shoebox is 400–538 sqft, matching URA's 50 sqm threshold; family-sized is 1,000–1,500 sqft.

• Freehold
• Leasehold

Key takeaways

• In 2025 freehold shoeboxes sell 14.6% below freehold family units per square foot. Leasehold shoeboxes still carry a 5.1% premium. What the two tables say
• Freehold began with the smaller premium and lost it faster, first going negative in 2021. Freehold
• Freehold and central-region stock overlap heavily, so this may be the regional finding under a different label. We are not claiming tenure is the cause. The complication

Freehold

Median resale psf, across the same developments at both ends of the period.

Year	Shoebox	Family	Premium	Developments (S / F)
2017	$1,514	$1,276	+18.7%	26 / 160
2018	$1,477	$1,421	+4.0%	37 / 143
2019	$1,529	$1,334	+14.6%	15 / 110
2020	$1,462	$1,340	+9.1%	20 / 97
2021	$1,472	$1,519	−3.1%	32 / 149
2022	$1,553	$1,641	−5.3%	22 / 109
2023	$1,787	$1,784	+0.2%	27 / 110
2024	$1,772	$1,888	−6.1%	30 / 127
2025	$1,732	$2,029	−14.6%	20 / 132

The premium is the shoebox figure over the family figure: how much more, per square foot, a small freehold unit fetched than a large one. A negative number means it fetched less.

Freehold first went negative in 2021 and has been negative in four of the five years since, reaching −14.6% in 2025, the widest discount in the series. The 2023 reading briefly returned to level at +0.2%, which is worth treating as a wobble on 27 developments rather than a recovery.

The freehold shoebox line itself has barely moved: $1,514 in 2017 to $1,732 in 2025. The freehold family line went from $1,276 to $2,029.

Leasehold

Year	Shoebox	Family	Premium	Developments (S / F)
2017	$1,297	$1,006	+28.9%	28 / 238
2018	$1,344	$1,078	+24.7%	33 / 236
2019	$1,377	$1,093	+26.0%	27 / 224
2020	$1,318	$1,093	+20.6%	27 / 236
2021	$1,372	$1,171	+17.2%	40 / 261
2022	$1,465	$1,278	+14.7%	37 / 242
2023	$1,571	$1,400	+12.2%	38 / 240
2024	$1,684	$1,466	+14.9%	35 / 247
2025	$1,631	$1,552	+5.1%	31 / 246

Leasehold falls in seven of the nine year-on-year steps, from +28.9% to +5.1%, and has not crossed zero in any year measured.

What the two tables say

Freehold started with the smaller premium (+18.7% against leasehold's +28.9%) and lost it faster. It has spent most of the last five years below zero. Leasehold, on the same measure, is still positive.

Put plainly: the belief that a freehold small unit is the safer store of value does not survive the last nine years. Freehold shoeboxes are the only cell in any cut we have run that in 2025 changes hands at a double-digit discount to their larger counterparts.

One important complication. Freehold stock concentrates in the CCR and the rest of central region (RCR); leasehold concentrates in the OCR. Our regional article found CCR shoeboxes going backwards over the same period. These may not be two separate findings so much as one fact seen through two labels. We cannot separate them with this data, and we are not claiming tenure is the cause.

A reading from practice, which we cannot test

What follows is interpretation from working in this market, not something the transaction record can confirm. Caveat data records the sale, never the buyer or the reason.

Freehold purchases skew toward buyers thinking in terms of legacy, an asset held across generations rather than a position to exit. Buyers in that frame are typically less budget-constrained, and a unit intended to be lived in or handed down tends to be a larger one. If the freehold buyer pool leans that way, demand concentrates in family-sized stock and the small-unit end of freehold loses its natural bidder.

Leasehold small units serve a different pool: buyers and investors working to a tighter budget, for whom a smaller unit may be the only entry point at all. That floor under demand does not disappear when sentiment shifts, which would explain a premium that erodes steadily rather than inverting.

We find this reading plausible and it fits the shape of the data. It is not evidence. Nothing in the caveat record identifies who bought, why, or with what intent, and a different explanation consistent with the same numbers would be equally unfalsifiable here.

What this does not tell you

• Whether tenure is doing the work. Freehold and central-region stock overlap heavily. This data cannot separate them.
• Anything about lease decay. Most leasehold stock in this sample still has seventy or more years remaining. What happens to a lease at forty years, or thirty, is a different question and out of reach here.
• Your development. These are medians across dozens of projects. Individual buildings diverge widely.
• What happens next. Nine years of history, not a forecast.

Method and data notes. Data to 17 July 2026.

Private non-landed resale caveats, condominium and apartment. Executive condominiums excluded, collective sales excluded. Shoebox is 400–538 sqft, matching URA's 50 sqm threshold; family-sized is 1,000–1,500 sqft.

Each tenure-and-size line runs on its own fixed panel: developments with at least three transactions in that band, in that tenure, in both the 2017–2019 and 2023–2025 windows, so each column describes the same buildings at both ends. Medians are taken across developments rather than pooled across transactions, which would let the changing mix of what sold masquerade as a change in price.

Because the shoebox and family panels are separate sets of buildings, the premium here is a comparison across developments rather than within a single one. Our first article in this series measures the premium inside each building, which is a stricter comparison but excludes any development that does not contain both sizes. The figures are therefore not directly comparable between the two pieces; the direction and the timing are.

2026 is excluded: the partial year leaves too few developments per cell. Data to 17 July 2026.

Updated 4 August 2026: shoebox is now defined as 400–538 sqft, matching URA's 50 sqm threshold, bringing this article into line with the rest of the series. Figures re-run; the finding is unchanged.